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5. Since 1957 Southside Leather Corporation has maintained a substantial deposit
with Danville Bank & Trust Co. Until June 26,1959, the Bank recognized without objection that Arthur Swnmit was President of the Corporation, that Thomas Crump lvas
its Vice-President, and that each was authorized to independently draw on the Corporation's deposit in the Bank without limit. At 9:30a.m. on June 26th, Summit went
to the Cashier of the Bank, stated that Crump had ceased to be an officer of the
Corporation on June 23rd, that Crump's authority to check on Corporation funds had
ended on that date, and demanded that the Bank honor no outstanding checks which had
been signed only by Crump. Also on June 26th, but at ll:OOa.m, Crump came to the
Bank and stated to the Cashier that Summit had ceased to be an officer of the Corporation on June 23rd, that his authority to check on the Corporation's funds had
ended on that date, and demanded that the Bank honor no outstanding checks which had
been signed only by Summit. Shortly thereafter several checks were presented to the
Bank for payment, some of which had been drawn by Summit, and some of which had been
drawn by Crump. The Bank at once informs you of what has occurred and inquires
whether there is any means by which it may determine which demand it should recognize ,
Assuming there is no statutory remedy available in Virginia, what should you advise:
(EQUITY). Assuming that the question means what legal remedy has the Bank, it could
file a bill of ipter leader in a court of equity, pay the amount of the disputed
checks into cour , and make all interested arties d~f~ndants. It would ordinarily
be easier to procure a properly authen icated formal resolution from the Board of
Directors of the Corporation.
6. Great Eastern InVur~a1.co. desiring to construct a large office building of
modern design in the City of Norfolk, entered into a contract with Frank Boyd White
a designer and architect of wide acclaim, by the terms of which the Insurance Co. '
agreed to pay White $60,000 for designing and supervising the construction of the
building. The contract further provided that White shouid be paid $20 1 000 upon the
cormnencement of construction, ~~20,000 when the building was half completed, and the
balance when the building was read~. for occupancy. White designed the building and
construction was commenced on May 29,1959. At that time the Insurance Co. paid White
$20,000. On June lOth and wholly without justification, White began an argument with
the general contractor, flew into a rage, and walked off the project stating that he
would have nothing more to do with it. No persuasion by officials of the Insurance
Co. could cause White to change his position. On June 15th the Insurance Company
brought a suit for specific performance against White in the Circuit Court of the
City of Norfolk. In its bill the Insurance Company recited the foregoing facts and
further alleged that it was ready, willing and able to perform its obligations under
the contract, and that it was impossible to procure the services of another designer
and architect who could adequately perform the obligations of White. vfuite filed a
demurrer to the bill. How should the court rule on the demurrer?
(EQUITY) The demurrer should be sustained. A court of equity will not compel specific
performanc~f a c~tract for per§onal _services. It is not practica1 :ror it to supervise the services and results in . involuntary servitude not as punishment for a crime
which is prohibited by the 13th amendment to the federal Constitution. See Restatement of Contract #379 •
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). Landowner filed a suit in the Circuit Court of Fauquier County, Virginia,against
Prospector. The bill of complaint averred the existence of a written contract by +,h:
terms of which Landowner agreed to sell and Prospector to buy for the sum of $60,000
fq_ur tracts of land, designated as White Acre, Black Acre, Wild Acre and Green Acre .
The bill contained a further averment that the parties did not intend the sale and
purchase of Green Acre, and that the draftsman of the written contract had mistaker>·
ly included that tract of land in the contract. The bill concluded with the prayer
that the contract be rqformed and that the court grant specific performance of the
reformed contract. Pro .pector filed a plea of the statute of frauds, to which plea
Landowner demurred. Upon due consideration the court overruled the demurrer. Whereupon, the court heard evidence ore tenus and, over the objection of counsel .'f or
Prospector, Landowner was permitted to ~ntroduce evidence tending to prove that the
parties did not intend to include Green Acre in the written contract of sale and
that it was included by mistake. The chancellor entered a decree reforming the
contract and granting specific performance as prayed in the bill of complaint.
Did the court commit error:
(l) In overruling the demurrer to the plea of the statute of frauds, and
(2) In admitting parol evidence to prove the intention of the parties and the
mistake of the draftsman of the contract?
(EQUITY) (l) Answering this according to substantive law(since, technically, ~
demurrer does not lie to a defensive plea in equity) the statute of frauds is no
defense because the effect of the reformation is to nullify so much of the contrac t
as it relates to, and hence there is no enforcement of an oral contract to buy or
sell land. Besides the statute of frauds applies only to contracts made by the
parties and not to those imposed by some rule of law.(2) Nor did the Court commit
any error in admitting the parol evidence, as the parol evidence rule does not appl~
to equity cases for reformation. To hold otherwise would result in great injustice
and enable one party to be unjustly enriched at the expense of another. See Lile's
Notes on Equity Jurisprudence pp.l29-l30.

5.~By'l)his

last will and testament dated Jan.l8,1943, William Richards provided,
among other things, as follows:
"I direct my executor to sell and convey my farm 1Richardswood 1 as soon as
practicable after my death and for a conaideration he deems to be fair,and
after paying the expenses incident to the s ale, to pay the entire proceeds
therefrom to my son, John Richards."
W1lliam Richards died on Jan.3,1969, and his will containing the above language
was duly admitted to probate. Shortly after William's death but before his executor
could find a sale for 11 Richardswood, 11 John Richards also died.
After the sale of "Richardswood.," John 1 s administrator demanded that the proceeds
be paid to him, John's heirs -at-la~ also demanded the proceeds; and John's widow
contended that the s ale of 11 Richardswood11 was subject to her dower.
The executor under William Richards' wi ll instituted a chancery proceedi ng in the
proper court, seeking the guidance of the court in the distribution of the proceeds
of the farm.
How s hould the court rule with r espect to the demands of(a)John's administrator,
(b)John's heirs-at-law, and (c)John 1 s wi dow?
(EQUITY) Since testator directed the land .to be s old in any event, and since equity
r egards that as done which ought to be done , the far m, under t he.doctrine of e~uit
able convers i on, wi ll be treated as i f personalty. Henc e the ent1re proceeds ~11
go to John's adminis trator fre e from any dower claims by John' s widow to be disposed
of by him in accordance with law.
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7• Enterprise, Inc., ~wned valuable real and personal property but also owed a great
many debts, some of which were secured by deeds of trust, and some judgments had
been obtained and executions levied. The corpOration instituted a chancery suit,
making all of its creditors parties defendant. The bill alleged the property owned
by the corporation ani the liens thereon, that some of its creditors had obtained
judgments and others would do so, that it owned a large amount of valuable property,
and while not iruiblvent, that it was "largely indebted" and was unwilling or incompetent to manage its own business so as to pay off its debts. The bill concluded
with a prayer that a receiver be appointed to take charge of its affairs.
The bill was taken for confessed as to all the defendants except one creditor,who
demurred, assigning lack of equity as the ground. How should the court hold?
(EQUITY) The demurrer should be sustained. There is no controversy before the court.
One cannot simply say to a court of equity, "Things are not going too well with me
so please appoint a receiver to run my affairs." See 145 Va.568.
7;(~~ deed dated Jan.l2,1945, V-C Land Bank conveyed to Gracie Brown a 50 acre farm
situated in Henry County,Va. By deed dated Jan.25,19h5, Gracie Brown conveyed this
property to her brother, George Brown, who did not record his deed since there were
several judgments of record against him. On Jan.l5,1948, Gracie Browr1 executed a
deed of trust on the property to Will Williams, Trustee, to secure a note of $4,000
made by George Brown and Gracie Brown, both of whom were unmarried. By deed dated
April 3,1958, and recorded on the same date, Gracie Brown executed a deed for the
land to her mother, Maggie Brown. On November 7, 1958, Will Williams, Trustee,sold
the property at public auction under the terms of his deed of trust and it was bid
in by George Brown for the sum of $12,000. After the payment of the expenses of the
sale. the debt secured. and some small ,liens on the property, there remaineg5 ~~ thA
ands of the Trustee approximately $6,000. Both George Brown and Maggie Brown claim
this surplus. Will Williams, Trustee, filed a bill of interpleader asking the Court
f or' a determination of their respective rights.
In the proceeding which followed, it appeared that Maggie Brown, prior to April ~~
1958 had knowledge of the unrecorded deed from Gracie Brown to George Brown.
Maggie Brown insisted that George Brown was not entitled to equitable relief because
he did not come into Court with clean hands as his failure to record his deed constituted a fraud on his creditors.
How should the Court hold?
(EQUITY) The Court should hold that George Brown is entitled to the proceeds in a
contest not involving George Brown's creditors. George has clean hands so far as
Maggie Brown is concerned. The fact that one commits a fraud against X does not
deprive the perpetrator of the fraud of his rights so far as the rest of the world
is concerned. Since George was prior in time and Maggie knew of this earlier unrecorded conveyance to htm, she takes subject to it.
11
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2 ;JProctor, a building contractor, "~>ras indebted to Craft Supply Co. in the sum of
$5 1 000 for materials purchased by Proctor on credit. When Craft pressed Proctor for
payment, Proctor asked for an extension of time to pay the debt, and Craft agreed
to take Proctor's 60-day note with surety approved by Craft. Accordingly, Proctor
presented his non-negotiable note to Craft, which was endorsed by Wise as surety.
Craft accepted the note.
Unknowh to Craft, Proctor had induced Wise to become surety by executing a bond to
Wise, which stated that its purpose was to indemnify Wise against possible loss
because of his statu~as sqrety. The bond was secured by a deed of trust on Proctor~:
home to Trustee; executed ~y Proctor and his wife and properly recorded.
When Craft's note became due, Proctor failed to pay it, and he then disclosed to
craft his indemnity agreement with Wise. Craft consults you and asks whether he has
any legal standing to compel Trustee to foreclose the deed of trust and to apply
the proceeds therefrom to the debt owed to Craft. How should you advise Craft?
(EQUITY --SURETYSHIP) "A creditor has the right to be substituted to any securities
given by the principal debtor to his sureties." 18 M.J., Subrogation #28, notes 17
and 18 citing 10 Leigh 206 and ~64 Va.491, 180 s.E.281. This right is not founded
on contract but upon a principle of natural justice. Id.

<t.. l
8)Midnight Trucking Co. is a common carrier engaged in transporting pr9perty in
intrastate commerce under certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by
the State Corporation Commission. Midnight operates chiefly in southside Virginia
between Richmond and Emporia, at rates in accord with tariffs approved by the
Commission.
Black Jack Transport Corporation is a contract hauler operating intrastate in
Virginia under a permit issued by the State Corporation Commission and under license
issued by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. Midnight and Black Jack are competing
carriers.
Midnight has brought a suit in equity in the Law and Equity Court of the City of
Richmond to enjoin Black Jack from transporting property at a lower freight rate
than that fixed by the State Corporation Commission for common carriers in the area
serviced by the two companies. Midnight, in its bill, alleged that such action on
the part of Black Jack is causing and has caused great and irreparable harm to
Midnight and is in violation of the statutes of the Commonwealth. In support of its
position, Midnight cites a section of the Code of Virgini which reads as follows:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation, after receiving a
license from the Commissioner(of Motor Vehicles)as herein provided to transport
any commodity in any territory at a less freight rate or charge than that fixed
by the State Corporation Commission for a common carrier for the same commodity
in the same terri tory. 11
Black Jack demurred to the bill contending that Midnight is not entitled to injunctive relief since an adequate remedy at law is available in that the violation
is punishable by fine or imprisonment as provided- by the Code~ How should the Court
rule?
(EQUITY) The Court should grant the injunctive relief. The fact that the Commonwealth might institute criminal proceedings over which Midnight would have no voice
is not an adequate remedy. Midnight is being hurt directly and it is difficult for
him to prove just how much. Hence it should be allowed to institute proceedings on
its own to protect itself from this unfair competition. See 196 Va.747 in the
Equity cases in these Notes.
page :;:>01.1.·
;Jijh W ~ow by contract in writing, agreed to sell to Upton Littlejol:m hi~ f::1.~ '·
6
nHoe~o~n"e:ituated in Brunswick County,Va. By the terms of the codntrtactfL~tthtleJol:m
f $60 000 · ety days from the a e o
e con~~r~~d !~ ~~ic~h~i~~~a::/~!c~;eive ~ gen~~:l warranty deed. At the time th~ con·
a '
d . t L'ttlejohn had explained to Weedrow that he had to obta~n a
tract was entere 1n o ~ te Land Bank to enable him to make full payment of the
loan of $40~000 f~o~hA~~!\ad as of the date of the contract, made application ~or
~~:c~~~-p~~c~~~lejo~n did not tender payment of the p~r:hase p:ice within the t1mE
··
h contract Weedrow addressed a letter to h1m stat1ng that he was
~~~:~~~d ~~etc~ntract te;minated for his failure to pay the purchase price on the
· g
d
Af
days after receiving the letter Littlejohn consults you!
dat~ ~t was ue. a e~ust received a notice from the Allstate Land Bank that h1S
adv1Sl.ngd bthat he h s ~ nd that he would receive the money within ten days. He als'loan ha
een approve a
T.n... t
th
· hts and
stated that he was very anxious to acquire the farm. ~~a ~e
e r1.g
.
. .
remedies of Littlejohn, if any, and how should you adv~se h~?
(EQUITY) I would advise him that he could successfully sue 1n equ1.ty for spec1f~c
erformance of the contract. He must tender the $60,000 plus inte:est to date ~
~ d of the full amount. Time is not ordinarily of the essence 1.n cont6acts 0
s:~le~and and the delay was not due to Littlejohn's fault. See 150 Va.6J •
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.S . b(,John Seldon, a widm-rer, we.s a r e s i dent of R::.chmo nd and vras employed by a corporation 1iThi ch required his moving to Roanoke on Novembe :;.~ 1, 1 961. On October 6,
1961, Seldon entered into a writ ten contract with Ar thur Bro-vm by the terms of which
Brown a greed to purchas e from Seldon the latte rt s r e s1.denca in t he City of Richmond
f or *30 , 000. The cont r act wa s sj.gned by bot h Seldon and Brown , and provided that
the deed should be delivered and the purch ase price paid on November l s t.
On October 12th the t.ouoe on the p roperty was tot aJ~y destroyed by a fire of
unknown origin. At the time of it s des t r uct i on , tbe hous e was not covered by fire
ins urance, a new policy fo r 1rThic h Br oom I1ad applied S8v eral days bef ore not hav ing
yet been i ssued. Notv-Tithstanding t his , on November l s t Seldon tende red t o Brmm a
duly executed deed of general wa rranty and demanded payment of the $30 ,000 . Brown
r efused to make the payment.
On November 8th Seldon in stituted a suit against Brown in the Law and Equity
Court of the City of Hiclllllond as ki ng specifi c p erformance of the contract t o s ell.
In his bill Seldon alleged t he f ore going f a ct s . On Novemter 25th Brown filed a
demurrer to Seldo n i s bHl, which demurrer reci t ed e.s it s grounds (a) that Seldon
had an adequate remedy at l aw, and (b ) that the des truction of the house excused
Brown' s pe rforma.nc e of t he c ontr2.ct .
How should the court r ule on e a(;h ground of the delllurr e r ?
(EQUITY) (a ) Seldon has no a<i equat e r emedy at law. The r e is a p r e s umption that the
value of the realty and the p rice t o be paid are t he same , and hence Seldon could
only re cover nomi nal dam a ges, E ' any. I t is als o argna~)le t hat the r e i s a part ial
failure o f conside r at i.on wh1.ch would eycus e t he buyer as f a r a s a com ·t of lR\v is
conc erned .
(b ) This co-:1t e ntion i s c or rect. I n spite of t he general doctrine of
equi table conversion that doctri ne is a fi ct i on that Hi ll neve r be employe d to do
injus tice. 'l'he remedy of spc ci f i e perfor manc e i s disc r et io nary and will be wit hheld in cas e s of great hards hip . "Cou rt s of e qui t y will not e xerci se juri sdi ction
in spe cific perfo1~ance where it would i mpos e hards hip on people not cens ura ble i n
~11:9

•

condu ct and where the d r cumstance s and conditions have been s o ch<>.nged as t . tro r k
l oss and hards hip to them." 1®7 Va. 1G9 ~n p . :u oG of t !18 Equity Case s t n th2"'e
n0tes . Not e : The above case was one i n whic h the zoning l aws 'I·Tere chanced aft er
UlC contrac t had been made. Many authoritL')s st::tte that the r i sk of l oss i n cases
o f col!tract s to s ell r ealty is on the buyer a s soon as the cont r act i s e f fcct j_ve .
8i.nce l"e is enti tled to any ga i n he s hould be sub ;j ec:t t o any lo ss not due t o the
fault of t he s eller . Hence the buyer ha s an ins urable int-e re st be f ore he gets a deed .
T:1ere is no Virgi ni a ca s e in poi nt where there was a l oss by f i re , and the r e t s a
copfl tct of autho ri ty els ewhe r e .

.Di~ner, a widower, died intestate 1n 1961, leaving surviving him an adult son,
Silas, and an adult daughter, RacheL He owned at his death an office building in
Danville, Va., the fair market value of which was $120,000, according to an
appraisal made for Silas and Rao~el.
Rachel and Silas were advised by their grocer that in Virginia on the death of the
father a two-thirds interest in the realty passed by intestate succession to Silas
as a son> and that a one-third interest therein passed to Hachel as a daughter.
Believing this to be the law, Silas and Rachel entered into a written contract
whereby ~he agreed to sell to Si~a all her "right, title and interest" in the
building for $40,000. Neither party knew that they had been misinformed as to their
interests.
Upon discovering the mistake, Rachel sued Silas for re~cission of the contract.
Silas' defense was that Rachel ' s mistake as to the law was not ground for a rescission, and he prayed affirmatively for specific pe-rforma nce· How should the court

5

•

rule?

.

(EQUITY) The Court should rule in favor of Rachel. This is regarded as a ~stake of
f t 8 to what the parties owned, and ~ince it was mutual , rescission for mutual
m~~ta~e of fact should be all<."'wed. ''The general ru~e(i.e. that equity will not
ind because of mistake of law) has no applicc~aon to the mistakes of persons as
r~~c t tleir own private, l egal ri ghts and interestt1 . The latter s t and on the footing
of mistakes of fact -lHHt". See 13 M.J., Histake and Accident, Last paragraph of

#6

and

108 Va.$1.

t>''

~ ' On June 10 , 1961, Nachines, Inc. , enter ed i nto a contract vJitb Richmond Publishing Company by the terms of which t he l atte r l eas ed f r om Machi nes, I nc. , for a term
of 3 year s four print ing ma chines at an annual re ntal of $12, 000. The ma chi nes were
pl aced i n operation by Ricl11r1ond Publi shi ng Company at the t imz the lease agreement
was executed. On November 15, 1961 JV!achi.nes , I nc . , r ecei v0d the f ollmvi.ng l etter
from Ri chmond Publ ishi ng Company:
"November 15, 1961
"Machines , I nc .
12 Main Street
Richmond, Virgi ni a

•

"Gent l emen:
"This i s to advi se th.:::t -v;e have been t est i.ng printing :nachines manuf act ured
by Aj ax Equi pment Company, and have found them qui te superior to the machi nes which
we have on l ease from you. . Al so, Ajax Equi rJ:nent Cor.1pany has proposed t o l ease u s
fo ur of their machi nes at 2.n annual :;.·ental of but $8 ,000 . This will i nform you
that we hereby t erminate our lease agr 0ernent wit h you E:ff ective Decembe r 1 , 1961,
at whish t i me we 1rrill enter into a new agreem&nt -vJ:i th Aj ax Equipment Company. You
are di rected to cause your machi nes t o be r emoved from our premises on t hat date .
Wifer y t r uly yours,
RICHMOND PUBLISHING COMPANY
P.y R. E. Butl er, Pr esident. "
On November 20 ~ 1961, Machi nes , I nc . ; brought a suit aga.i nst Ri chmond Publi shi ng
Company i n Chancery Cour t of the City of Richmond, seeki ng an injunction to restrair:
Ricrunond Publishi ng Company from breachine; its contract w"tt h the pl a.inti f f. The
bi ll f or an i nj unction re cited t h8 .lor'.:JGoinr.; fa cts . On De cember 2, 1961 the defendant file d i t s darnur rer t o the bi ll .
HoN s hould the court r ule on tile damurr8r ?
(EQUITY) The demurrer :>hould be :mstained . N2.chines, Inc . has an adequate remedy
at l aw , namel y an action for damave s fo r breJ.ch of cont n ct . See 115 Va. 797 .

5.- On March 1,1958, Thomas Feather borrowed :$5,000 from the Eastside Buildi ng and
Loan Association and secured the payment of the note evidencing the debt by a deed
of trust on his house in Bowling Green, Virginia. This trust constituted a first
lien on the property. On Aug,.l0,1958, Feather borrowed :~),000 from his friend Joe
Pluck and secured the note evidencing that debt by a mortgage on the same property,
which constituted a s econd lien. A third lien on the property was created by a deed
of trus t dated Apri l 7,1959, s ecuring a note in the amount of $4,000 payable to
Feather' s friend, Sam Comb. On Feb.l0,1962, Eastside Building and Loan Associ ation
advised Feather that they would advertise his property for sale under the fir s t deed
of trust unles s he paid his obligation within f i ve days. To prevent the sale of his
home Feather persuaded his mother Rosie, who was then 80 years of age and who had
had no previ ous bus iness experience, to lend him $5,000 to pay the debt. As Ro sie
was living in her son's home she l et him have the money upon his assurance that he
was i ndebted to no one except the Loari Company, and that the deed of trust would
protect her. Feather paid the debt due the Loan Company with the money recei ved from
his mother. The Loan Company note was not delivered t o Ro si e, nor was the deed of
trust r el eas ed. In May, 1962, Joe Pluck commenced a suit to for eclose the mortgeg e
s ecuring his debt and made Sam Comb a party thereto. Rosie Feather learned of this
suit and upon advi ce of counsel she intervened in the cause , proved her debt and
claimed priority of payment. The f oregoing facts were es tabli shed by proof and the
evi dence also showed that the property had a fair market value of $8,000.
May Rosie Feather succ eed in her claim that s he j ~ enti tled to pr i or i ty of pa~nent
from the proc eeds of t he s ale of the property? ·-:) ~ Y
(EQUI TY) Yes. Headnote 12 to 179 Va.394 on p.395 reads, "A party advancing money to
di schar ge a pri or l ien who does not search the r ecords to discover other liens, but
who r el ies on the borrower' s a s s urance that there are no other liens, is no t bar red
from his r ight of subrogation as agains t a junior encumbrancer who is not pre judiced'S
And Headnote 2 r eads, 11 The doctri ne of subrogation i s not dependent aupon contract,
nor upon pri vity between the parties; it is the creature of equity, and i s founded
upon pri nc i ples of natural justice", s o Ros i e s ucceeds in her claim to priority.
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57't-1he City of Norfolk enacted an ordinance requiring ~t~ residen~s to _ sec~~e ~~t ,.,.
ermH to drive a motor vehicle in the City and author2z~ng and d7rec~~ng .·1 ~ ~ Y "'
~hi~f of Police to revoke the driving permit "of any driver who, ~n hlS op~n1.on,
person
whoth~
se
becomes unfit to drive an automobile on th e s t ree t s of the City •" t.Any C
t of
p;rmit was so revoked was given the right to apply to the Corpora ~on our
City for its reinstatement.
.
d · s vua··
Holt a resident of Norfolk, sacured the proper permit b~t was ~nvo 1. ve J.n e.
accide~ts, and also was convicted of speeding o~ on~ occas~?~· Th~dC~1.e;e~;k~~:1.ce,
upon lea:;:ni.ng theRe facts, notified Holt that hJ.s ?1. ty perml ~ wou
:evokin the
Holt instituted a suit, seeking to enjoin the Ch~ef of Po:~ce from ld suf~er
ermit. The bill alleged that the ordinance was voJ.d aCJ.d that ~olt wou
ounds.:
lrrepare.ble dama.ge if his permit was re-voked. A demurrer was f~led on the gr
( ) '!'hat Holt had an adequate remedy at lavJ; and
.
(~) .j'hat the court had no jur:i_sdiction to 0n?oin . :he ~nf~rcement of the ordu.c.nce.
How should the court rule on e~eh g.·..·ounC. of t.h~ _ d::.~ur~ erj .
o uide the
( ~QUITY) (a) The orC:inance is voJ.d becatwe no cr1.t. er~a are 1aJ.d do~,~ . g
1
of police and because i
on
him Holt has no adequate rem' -y a
avT.
•
·
h' 1· ense and the t r o'.lbJ.e and expense of an appeal.
.
.
revocatJ.on of lS lC2 f 62 .W V 66~"' 7c9 S E 623 reads . ''Wnere property n.ghts m.ll
(b) Court headnote
o
· • a . ::; ,
j
•
•
d " s nder
" •
b destroyed or their lavJful enjoyment be taken away ~:y c r~m~nal pro~ee 1ng t~
e · val;d law or ordinance, equi·cy has jurisdiction uo _enJOln them. Hence
e
an J.n ....
.
c
, 5J r:' V 3, 7
demurrer in each case should be overruled . ,_,ee
a ._ o •
J.

c~ief

td~ll~g~l~:Y ~~n~~~~ 1~e;~~l~~i;~b~~~t J~~ ~~:lu~~:=~~l
.L.

::;

_i) g~opping

•
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Center, Inc., secured a written option from Wyndham to purchase land
with a dwelling ther eon at t he agreed price of $10,000. Du i.' ing t.he option period, but
before its exercise, the dwelling Has destroyed by fire. Wyndham collected fire
insurance for the l oss in the sum of $5,000.
Can Shopping Center, Inc. now exer~ise the option and demand performance with
abatement in the purchase price for the loss of the dwelling?
(EQUITY) No. There was no contract, and hence no equitable conversion. Wyndham never
agreed to sell for $5 ,000, and Shopping Center was never und er any duty to buy at
any price. See 11 ALR 2d 436.
bC,'?

B. Iready Wash contracted to buy from Joe Long a lot in the City of Staunton. At the
time of the contract it was knm-m by both parties that the purchaser proposed to
use the lot for the purpose of erecting a s elf··servic e laundry, which purpose was
not prohibited by the zoning ordinances of the City of Staunton. Subsequent to the
time the contract was executed and before the time for the delivery of the deed,the
City Council of Staunton, by ordinance, rezoned the lot so that it could be used for
residential purposes only . At the time for the deli very of the deed, Ready Wash refused to pay the purchase price and a suit for spe0 i fic performance was filed
against it by Long. The above f acts constituted all the evidence presented when the
hearing was held, and no question of fraud 9 misrepre sentation or unfair dealings on
the part of either the complainant or the defendant was alleg ed .
How should the Court rule?
(EQUITY) Long cannot recover. The entire purpose of t he cont r act has been frustrated.
Long still has the lot, so he i s not injured. To compel Ready Wash to buy it when
it has no use for it and needs its funds for other purposes would work an unconscionable hardship on it with no correspondi.ng be nefit to Long . 187 Va.l69 on P.l306
of the Equity Cases in these Notes.

C2.nnon and Herbert Jones each owned 30% of the capit3l stock of H~~~~ell
Tre.fj t o-r Co:q:-o::: at.ion. The rema:i.ning hO% of the stock was owned by John Fla.gg, who ho.d
cor.stan i:.ly been in disagreement -vJ'i th Jones concerning business policies, and who had
cmctom!l.rily found it possible to control the Corporation 1 s affairs l-l"i th tha assist,-·
anoe of' Cannon. Being a person of ad·~ranclild yee.rs and wishing to retire from the
b·u.a iness, on June lS, 1964, Carmon contracted to sell all his stock to Jones at a
pr ice of $30$>000., On Learning of this, Flagg offered Cannon ~tL.o,ooo for th.e sJ~ock.
Cannon then told Jones of Flagg's offer and st,ated that he considered his arr:mgement with Jones terminated, but that he(Cannon) would retain his stock until July
lst fo::.- s ale to Jones if Jones would match Flggg' s offer of ~p40, 000. On June 2ht.n
J ones instituted a suit in the Ci:i.~cui t Court of the City of Hopewell for the
s pecific performance of his contract with Cannon, and alleg8d his own readiness
to pay Gannon the $30,000 purchase price. Cannon now· consults you and inquires
whether he has a good defense to this suit in equity. What should you advise him?
(EQUITY) I would advise that Cannon did not have a good defense. Equity will give
specific performance of his contract. Since this stock represents a controlling
:Lnterest in the corporation it is unique and money damages for breach of contract
1vould not be an adequ.a te remedy.

41 S:ifu.a rt

5 lBn</May 29, 1959 Joseph Hill borroued $2500 from Afton Trust Company and executed
a deed of trust on his residen.ce to secure a promis sory note then given by him
under the terms of whic-h he ~remised to repay on Hay 29, l96h the borrowed sum of
$ 2500 together with interest th':·.n acc-rued at 6;~ per annwn. Afton Trust Co:npany
promptly placed the note in s afekeeping - and had the deed of tre1st record$d. Hill now
comes to see you and advises that he 1vas unable to pay the loan vrhen due. He a:OOo .
tells you that during the past few days he has obt~ined from his uncle, Harry Hill,
a sum of money sufficient. to pay the ~~2500, :plus interest and attendant costs, that
he has tende.red this money to Afton Trust Co., but the Company has informed him that
i+, f ully intends to enforce its deed of trust by selling ·the property at public
aucti on on July 31st. Hill f ur"lihe!" iDforms you that he. cannot raise sufficient
funds to enable hi.tn to bid in the property SlJ.ccessfully at the foreclosure sale and
inquires 1-1l1at nature of court proce ecnng , if any, he may pursue to prevent the sale
and clear th9 property of the en;:;ll.'llO:t'anc.:e of the deed of trust. V.'hat should you
advise him?
(EQUITY) Hi ll should institute a suit in ec;uity to redeem the r e sidence and to enj oint Tr ust Company· from for oelosing. Ho should also offer to pay a.ll sums due to
da te of a valid tender for he who s 2eks equity must do equity . See 29 Gra.tt.27.

s)isl Benson owned contiguous lots of land(Nos ._50 and 51) in Highland Subdivi.sion,
in A11gusta County, Va.. In 1963 a dwelling hour.e was constructed on Lot No .50. on
March 1, 1964, by general warranty deed, Benson conveyed Lot 50 in the Subdivi3ion
to E. Z. Carter o On March 10, 1964, by a general warranty deed, Benson conveyed
Lot No· 51 to Horace Peyton. On Narch 12, 1964, Peyton le<.lrncd, for the first time,
that the d~,.dling house on Lot 50 encroached for a dist;mcc of 4 feet upon Lot 51
-vr.hich he had purche.sed. He promptly wrote a letter to Carter dema::1cling that he
re~1ove his house from his, Pe~ton' s, lot. Carter replied by lette:.~ .• admitting that
h1s house encroa~hed 4 feet upon Peyton's lot but. refused to remove it, claim.i ng
that Peyt,on should have knOlm of the encroachment before he purchased. After consulting counsel Peyton Gommen: ed a suit in equity in the Circuit Court of Augusta
County, Va., against Carter and in his bill of ~omplaint he averred the foregoing
facts, and ~oncluded with the Pl"ayer that the trP.s paes b.~ aba ted by the r ~moval cZ
the encroachment, and thu. t. he be de•:-:::.·eed the qui zt p0S3ess). o~ of his land. Carter
demurred t c the h:i.ll o:.~ compla:i.nt upcn the grou.nd that I"eytcn had a complete and
adnquate r emedy at la\,l ~i"C.hcr by an act~. on in ejtlctment or by an action of unlawful
cetainer. How should t he court ruli.3 on the demuxrer?
(EQUITY) The dumurrer should re overruled. The legal remedies suggested are inadequate since the encroachment would still be thore. Even if equit y would balance
the hardships and give damag es in3tead it is still a cas e for equity.

•

•

6~~:h:Sy,

pla~e

Inc., a Virginia corporati on wi ·ch its principal
of business in
Richmond, obtained a loan from Finance Corporation, a Virginia corporation, in the
sum of ~~45 ~000 by executing a note th G r•~f or payable to Finance Corporation with
Allen, Baker, Coker, Dozier, and Eley, all resid ents of Ri cb. mo!l.d, as accommodation
makers .. Flimsy, Inc., failed in its operations and 'became i nsolvent. At maturity,
Finance Corporation made demand upon Allen for immediate payment, and to avoid
threatened litigation, Allen mad e payment of the entire $45,000. Allen thereafter
consults Lawyer and advises that Baker is hopelessly insol-v-ent, that Coker has left
the State and his rtJhereabouts is unknown, that Dozier and Eley are solvent and still
live in Richmond but have r efused to make any payment of the indebtedness, and that
he, Allen, wants to effect a maxi;num recovery. What should Lawyer advise as to:
1. The nature of Allen 1 s right, if a.ny, against the other accommodation makers.
2. Whether Allen should prcceed by an action at lavJ or suit in equity.
3. The maximum amount, if any, Allen could expect to recover and from whcm, if
anyone.
(EQUITY)(l) The nature of Allen's right is a right of contribution--that since he has
paid more than his share others equally liable should equally contribute to the end
that Allen be re-imbursed to the extent he has paid more th2-n his part.
(2) Allen should proceed in equity. At law he could only recover one fifth, but
equity will take into consideration the facts that one co-surety is totally insolvent
and the other cannot be found.
(J; Hence Allen may reco,rer $15 .> 000 from Doz i er and ~~1): 000 f rom Eley.
See Restatement of Security #154 and 191 Va.495.

•
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7J ff-p'[edy Carriers, Inc., a Virginia corporation, brought a suit in equity against
Eager Truck Lines, Inc., a Virginia corporation, seeking to enjoin it from so l ic iting customers in and around Danville, Vae, and from carrying goods on a regularly
schedt.:.led route and at a rate less than the tariffs applicable to common ca.rriers.
'l'he bill alleged that both parties were controlled by sta.tute and t hat Speedy was a
li~ ense d common carrier subject to regulation as to soliciting and r ates , but that
Eager was a licensed contract carrier and accordingly was not subject to the same
rates but was prohibited from soliciting customers in the Danville territory for
regularly sched'u. led routeB. The bill also alleged that Ec.gcr' s unlawful actions
were cau3ing irreparable damage to Speedy. Eager filed a demurrer on the grounds
that the vari..ous statutory provisions controlling the t ':J'O car r iers specHicalJ..y provid ed for a fine or imprisonment or both for any violation, and therefore} Speedy
had no right to proceed with his suit in equity, there bc:Jing an adequate remedy at
law provided for by statute if, in fact, th ere was any violation by Eager. Assuming
that the statutory provisons were accuratel y se t forth in the demur rer:
How should the trial court r ule on the demurrer?
(EQUITY) The demurrer should be over-ruled. TrJhile equity will not usually enjoin
one from committing a crime, here Speedy Carriers is suf feri ng a special injury for
which there is no adequate remedy at lavr - A fj_ ne on t he offending carrier does not
compensate Speedy nor prevent f urther violations by Eager. See 196 Va. 747 •

')C. ~

8) The Trustees of the unincorporated Lodge of "Sons of Loyalty'' held title to a
lodge building in Richmond. A considerable debt, incurred in erecting the building,
was outstanding and the building was in disrepair in July, 1951. At that time the
Trustees, without authority, undertook to convey the building to the Trustees of
another unincorporated lodge known as nnaughters of Liberty", in consideration of
the latter's agreement to pay off the debt, repair the building and permit the
nsonstt· to use it for their meetings.
The Trustees of the nsonsn, at a regular meeting of the Lodge, reported their
action, and pursuant to the agreement the building was used on alternat3 Satur0ay
nights by the 11 Sons" and the "Daughters"; and the "Daughters" paid off the deb1,
repaired the building and kept it in good condition, spending a substantial sw 0f
money in so doing. This arrangement continued until December, 1964, at which -~ ine
a dispute arose as to which Lodge should use the building on Christmas E1re. One
misunderstanding and argument led to another, feeling ran high and epithets flew
fast, until one of the 11 Sons" examined the record and decided that the n·naughter:J 1'
had no title to the building. Thereupon suit was instituted by the 11Sons 11 against
the .,Daughters" to remove the deed as a cloud on their title and to enjoin the
'~Daughtersn from any further use of the building.
Assuming the above facts, what defense or defenses, if any, may the nnaughterst"
assert successfully?
(EQUITY) The '~Daughters" may rely on the defenses of laches and estoppel. All t :1n
"Sons" knew about the sale and acquiesced therein for a long period of time know_,_:: 'g
that the 11 Daughters 11 were making a substantial change of position, while they(the
"Sons't) reaped a substantial share of the benefits from what the "Daughters'' did.
Equity aids the vigilant and not the slothful. He who seeks equity must do
equity. See 195 Va.919.

k[Li,

owned a farm on the south side of a non-navigable river and B owned one on the
north side. B decided to erect a large building on his tract which would extend 10
feet into the channel of the river, thereby diverting the flow of water and narrowing the channel from 60 feet to 50 feet at this point. When B started the foundatior
for the wall A told him that the wall would unduly narrow the channel and would result in damage to A's land by flooding and severe washing of the bank. B replied
that he did not believe it would cause any such damage and he continued the construction of the wall. It was completed within 3 weeks.
Immediately upon the completion of the wall, A consults you and requests your
advice as to what court proceedings, if any,he may pursue to obtain relief.
What ought you to advise him?
(EQUITY) A may seek an iDjunction without awaiting damage, but must establish that
an i~ rable injury wi~realized unless immediate relief is granted. The dam,
if it would cause the injury alleged in this case, would be a private nuj~ce.
176 Va.201.

•
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5;l~hnson subscribed for 1000 shares of common stock of XYZ Corporation at $100

per share. He failed to pay the subscription price and hence the certificate for hie
shares was not delivered to him. The Corporation instituted an aetion at law against
Johnson for the subscription price, but it was denied recovery because of Johnson's
plea of the statute of limitations. Thereafter Johnson filed a bill in equity
against the XYZ Corporation to compel it to issue and deliver to him a certificate
for his shares of stock.
The Corporation by its answer and eross bill asserted that Johnson should be reruired to pay it what he owed the Corporation even though its claim was barred by
the statute of limitations.
I! the evidence substantiated these allegations of the parties, how ought the
chancellor to decide the cause?
(EQUITY) Johnson not entitled to stock certificate as he who seeks equity must do
equity; and Corporation cannot require payment barred by the statute of limitations.
Lyles, Notes on Equity Jurisprudence, P• ~; 119 Va.813.
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4o)~n Jo.nuary r;~f' 1963 Caliguln Cnoso.r~ o. widower residing on his fo.rm
in Ablomn.rlo County1 died intestato loo.ving ns his solo heirs his nuult
sons Nero o.nd Augustus• After tho fnthor•s dco.th, Nero continued to live
on the fnrm, but Augustus moved permo.nontly to Columbus, Ohio" Only
nbou t ono-hnlf of the fn.rm wn.s devoted to agricultural purposes, tho
bnlcmce being pc..rtly wooded and pnrtly used for limestone qua rrying 0
By ·'W ,; vomber of 1966 Nero bocnrnc tired of living on tho farm nnd
wished to move into Chnrlottesvillc to nccopt o. job offered him by o.
locnl department s t ore. Fooling himself in nood of money, Nero obto.inod
o.n appraisal which valued tho fo..rm o.t $60 1 000 0 Nero th ereupon wrote Augustus tolling him of tho nppraiso.l and urging tho. t he join with Nero
in effecting o. snlo of tho fo.rm 0 Augustus promptly replied stnting tho.t
ho ho.d such o.ffoction for till 11 old h omoplnco 11 thn t he would n ot bo wil·ling to sell his interest o.t nny price, and thnt he hnd no intention ·.Jf
returning to Vir gi nio. to discuss the matter further. Nero now consults
you and asks by who.t moo.ns, if o.ny, he n1ight successfully compel a so.lo
of tho farm while Augustus is n~sont :i,p)Ohio o.nd ove;r his objoction 0
~fuat should you o.Jviso Nero?
~~~;~
You sh ould advise Nero tho.t .he o.yOfil~ a bill in equity f or pnrtition
of the farm. Althougn Ausustus is n nocossnry party t o tho pnrtiti on
suit, he mny be served o.s n non-resident by order of publicnt ion. TI1o
stnto rightly has o.nd exercises jurisdiction over o.ll property within
its tcrritor:h 1 limits. A suit to pnrtition land is in the n nturo of o.
proce eding in rem, and whon tbD parties int e rest ed ho..vo boon proce eded
against in the methods prescri bod by ln.w, tho d oc roo oi' partiti on
is cJnclusivo oven o.s t o non-rosid9nts.

5 ~~a written c ontract signed by tho partios on October 6 1 1966, Alfroc.
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J~hns agreed to soll to Ro.lph Anlcs at their then market price 150 shares

vf tho cc.mmon stock of Amoricc..n Telephone and Telegraph Compo.ny 1 63

sho.ros of tho c ommun stock of Safo-vn:', y Stores, Inco rporated, o.nd 1000
sho.ros of tho co111r11on stock of Chryslvr Corp o r a ti on, del ivery of th o
shares o.ncl payment of tho purcho.so price t o bo ma.do on November 1 1 ,,. .
1966. By November 1st~ tho market price of these stocks ho.d rison by
an average; of $12.00 per sho.ro 1 because of that Johns refused t o metko
deliv e ry. Arne s has nuw brought in tho Circuit Court of Henri co County,
a. s ui t against John s so vking specific porformo.nco of tho contro.ct.
By his bill Amos ho.s o.ll ogod tho f vrcgoing fa. cts~ filled his copy of
the Hr-l tton co ntract o.s nn oxlJ.ibi t t o his bill~ o.nd h c~s p2.id into
c )urt tho n.gre....,d purchaso price. Johns has d emurred to tho bill. HovJ
shoulc.l the Court rule on tho demurrer?
Tho court should suntain this uC;murrol:\. Virginia courts of oqui ty 1-lill
n o t enterta in a suit o r int orforo with tho int or osts of tho po.rtios
vlhoro o.n adequate romomdy at lnvJ is o.vailo.ble. Hero, Amos ca.n bring o.n
acti on at l o.w f or do.mo.gos arising fr om J ohn 1 s bron. cll of the writt en c on·
trn.ct. Amos could then apply tho pro ceeds from tho jud.g:rnont t o tho original : .mrcho..so p::i co ::Ud buy tho · o':l~ valont cunount of 3toclc on tho
op en mo.rlcct. Equlty Wlll grant spOClflc performance on C 'ntracts f o r
sc.lo ;:,f pors r) l18.l property only whcro tho sub .P c t m.L'I. tt or •.J f tho c untract
is unique. Sho.ro:J . . . f s t o ck arc identi co.l 0

7i'tlrbara Bee instituted a suit in equity against Stingby Bee in the Circuit Court
of Lee County, Va. The Bill of Complaint charged: that her father, Bumble Bee, died
intestate seized of a large parcel of land upon which he had constructed a shopping
center, all of which had a value of $300,000; that her father was survived by his
only child, Barbara Bee, and his brother, Stingby Bee; that within thrity days after
her father's death she and her uncle, Stingby Bee, conferred respecting the ownership
of the land and shopping center, and that they decided, based upon the advice of a
mutual friend, a Notary Public, that they each had inherited a one-half undivided
interest in Bumble Bee's property; that Stingby Bee offered to purchase Barbara
Bee's half interest for the sum of $150,000, which she accepted; that Barbara Bee
executed and delivered to Stingby Bee a general warranty deed conveying to him all
of her right, title and interest in the tract of land with improvements; that
Barbara Bee accepted the purchase price and Stingby Bee recorded his deed; and that
a few months after this transaction had been closed Barbara Bee learned for the
first time that she had actually inherited the entire tract of land with improvements, and that she had sold her interest therein for a grossly inadequate price.
The Bill of Complaint concluded with a prayer that the deed for the property be set
aside upon the ground of mutual mistake of fact. Stingby Bee demurred to the Bill
of Complaint on the ground that the mistake was one of law which equity would not
grant relief.
How should the Court rule?
{EQUITY) The Court should rule for Barbara Bee. The mistake here is one of fact and
not of law. The maxim, ignorance of the law is no excuse, is confined to mistakes
of the general rules of law and has no application to the mistakes of persons as to
their own private legal rights and interests. Here there was a mutual mistake of
fact in which Equity should grant ~elief. 108 Va.51.

eJ(~lllie

Humble and Jimmy Bragg entered into a written contract by the terms of
agreed to convey to Jimmy Bragg her 125 acre apple orchard in
price was $200 per acre, or a total of $25,000. Upon tender of
the purchase price, Sallie refused to deliver a deed because she had been advised
that the property was worth $500 an acre. Bragg promptly instituted a suit in
equity for specifio performance of the contract. The Court heard evidence ore tenus
and the following facts were established: Sallie Humble had acquired the property
from her late husband by devise just three months before the date of the contract;
Sallie Humble knew nothing of orchard values at the time she entered into the contract and she relied upon Bragg's advice, honestly given, that it had a market value
of only $200 an acre; and the orchard was in excellent condition and had an actual
market value of $500 an acre. During the course of the hearing the Court inquired of
Bragg whether he would be willing to pay $500 an acre for the orchard. He answered
he would not. stating that Sallie had contracted to sell him the orchard for $200

m~Y~~»~le
•th~-·agreed p~chase

729.
an aore\. The Court refused to grant specific performance and entered a decree denying the relief prayed by Bragg. On .appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
Bragg contended that the Trial Cour..t had erred in refusing to enforce his contract
and to decree specific performance. How should the appellate court rule?
(EQUITY) The appellate court should deny Specific Performance. He who asks equity
must do equity. Here the defendant entered into the contract under the misrepresenta•
tion of the plaintiff, the completion of such contract being inequitable and unfair
to the defendant. Thus the court should not grant relief unless the granting can be
accomplished with conditions which will obviate that evil result. Thus Bragg's
failure to pay a fair price denies his relief.
Applications for Specific Performance are addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. The contract must be reasonable, certain, legal and mutual, and upon a
valuable or at least a meritorious consideration. The granting of Specific Performance is discretionary with the lower court. 108 Va.l79,108 Va.230,125 Va.546.

filed a bill in equity in the Ci~~~.it Court of Rockingham County against
his neighbor, Dale, alleging that~ he, Hill, had good title to a certain farm within
described boundaries in the eounty; that for years, Dale had recognized this title
and the boundary lines, but that recently Dale had destroyed portions of Hill's
fence and was trespassing repeatedly on the land and was allowing Dale's cattle to
go thereon and eat the grass and haystacks; that Dale, whose solvency was questionable, was cutting valuable woodlands; and that all of this was to the irreparable
damage of Hill, for which he prayed that the court permanently restrain and enjoin
Dale's trespassing and remove any cloud on the title caused thereby.
Dale demurred to the bill on the ground that it stated no cause of action of
which equity had jurisdiction, but the Court overruled the same 7 to which ruling
Dale excepted. Dale then filed an answer denying the the Court had jurisdiction over
the subject matter, denying all of the allegations of the bill, and asserting that
he had title to the disputed area. On a hearing ore tenus, the evidence showed that
this boundary had been in dispute for 10 years; Dale had torn out )0 feet of fence
and repeatedly had gone on the disputed land and his cattle had eaten two haystacks
and grazed one acre of land; and that the cutting of woodlands consisted of Dale's
gathering firewood and marking the trees for the new asserted boundary.
On a substantial conflict of the evidence as to the title, the chancellor found
that the boundary was as asserted by Hill, and after overruling Dale's motion to
dismiss, entered a decree in accordance with the prayer of the bill.
On appeal, Dale conceded that there was a conflict in the evidence as to title but
contended that the Court should have (a) sustained the demurrer or(b) sustained his
motion to dismiss. How should the appellate court rule on these contentions?
(EQUITY~~mll's bill to enjoin the trespas s of land is . ~ot demurrable, since it
included the essential averment that he owned the land t~ut even when there is a
prima facie title, if it is developed by the pleadings and proof that the real controversy is a disputed boundary of land, the bill, as a rule, will be dismissed
for want of jurisdiction. See 98 Va~790.
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leased from Landlord certain premises to be used as a restaurant. The
lease was for a term of four years from October 1, 1963, with Tenant being given
an option to renew for a term of an additional two years provided the Tenant gave
written notice by August 1, 1967 of the exercise of this ~i ght. The lease also provided that Tenant could place improvements on the premises and that Landlord would
reimburse Tenant upon vacation of the premises for one-half the reasonable value
of the i mprovements with a maximum reimbursement of $1,)00.
Tenant's business became very lucrative, and at the begining of the third year
Tenant built a $),000 addition to the building.Landlord was dissatisfied with
'
Tenant as he believed that Tenant catered to undesirable people and advised Tenant
of this but~ook no action. Landlord received no notice from Tenant of the exercise
of the option for renewal of the lease, and on Au gust 3, 1967, Landlord wrote
Tenant and advised that Tenant must vacate the premises on Oct. 1, 1967. On
August 7, 1967, Tenant gave written notice to Landlord that he was exercising the
option to extend the l eas e for the two-year period. On Oct. 2, 1967, Landlord
served an eviction notice on Tenant, tngether with a tender of $1,500. Tenant filed
a bill in equity in the proper court to enjoin Landlord from evicting him, alleging
that the renewal provision in the lease was ambiguous; that time was not stated to
be of the essence of the contract; that he had vastly improved the value of Landlord's property at great expense to hims e l~; that h~ s constructing a ~ ),000 addition
in the third year of the l e ase evidenced h1s intentl on to hnld over; that he did not
cise the option befor e August 1 simply because he had overlooked it due to the
e~=~s of other business; that he could not relocate his business anywhere within
~he area where his clientele was located; that Landlord would be unjus tly enriched;
d that he Tenant, would suffer irreparable harm and become bankrupt if evi cted.
anis tenant' entitled to the equitable relief sought?
(EQUITY) No. The provision was clear, and time was of its ess ence. When a lessee can
sign no excuse for his failure to give notice of renewal exc ept his own ne gligenc e
~= is not entitled to be rescued by a court of equity from the cons equences of his
negligence.

3.

~£7,

~lfdower, a resident of Richmond, owned real estate valued at One Hundred Thousand

Dollars~OO,OOO)

and stocks and bonds and income-producing securities and money in
amount of about Four Hundred Thousand Dollars($400,000). He and Miss Willing, a
retired school teacher, became engaged to be married. Miss Willing had no business
experience, and her only property consisted of a modest residence in one of the
suburbs. Widower told Miss Willing that it would be proper for them to enter into
an agreement for the settlement of their property rights. He said in this connection,
"You know I own my residence and in addition to that I have just a few securities,
about enough to provide a comfortable living for you and me, and that is all of my
estate.» Widower then produced a contract wherein, in consideration of her release
of any interest in his estate, he promised to leave his intended wife the sum of
•
Twenty Thousand Dollars,($20,000)at his death and that she should have dower in
any real estate acquired by him after the marriage. In the agreement he agreed to
release any rights which he might have in her estate. Relying on the statements
made by Widower, Miss Willing executed and acknowledged this agreement the day
before the marriage. The parties were married and lived together happily for ten
years at which time Widower died, and it was found that his estate was worth in
excess of Five Hundred Thousand Dollars($500,000) of which One Hundred Thousand
Dollars($100,000) was the real estate owned at the time of the marriage and the
remainder was in securities and cash, and that he also had life insurance payable
to his estate in the sum of One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars($150,000).
Widower, by his will,directed the payment of the Twenty Thousand Dollars($20,000)
to his wife and gave all of the rest of his property to his kindred.
You are consulted as to whether the agreement is binding on the widow. How
should you advise?
(EQUITY) The agreement is not binding on the widow. For an ante-nuptial agreement
to be valid, there must be either fair and reasonable disclosure for the wife
on else full disclosure of her husband's worth. Here there was neither full disclosure nor fair and reasonable provision for the wife. See 199 Va.l56.
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